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I

n the first part of this paper I will survey the terrain of
views towards qualia, then outline three views that are
taken to be arguments for the existence of qualia. Then I
will introduce a thought experiment from Daniel Dennett
involving two coffee tasters, Chase and Sanborn, and formulate a modified version of Dennett’s thought experiment with
each of the three corresponding basic arguments for the existence of qualia.
The guiding thread behind all this is twofold: (1) the
claim that, “the only things that can be referents of logically
proper names are objects of existence and identities of which
one cannot be mistaken about.”1 (2) The claim that qualia
don’t satisfy this condition.

This guiding thread can be expressed in the three following:
(P1) When a proposition p, contains a word that lacks a
determinate truth condition, we have no epistemic access
to form a belief about p.
(P2) If we cannot form a belief about p, any
meaning that p has will not refer to the existence
or identity of something which we cannot be mis
taken about.
(C1) All theories of explaining, conceiving, or knowing
qualia don’t satisfy the conditions of P1 and P2, and
thus, qualia-talk is not talk about anything.2
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Qualia is a special kind of stuff in the universe. It is the
stuff that has the ‘raw feels’; the stuff that’s ineffable; the stuff
that’s intrinsic; the stuff that’s private; the stuff that is “directly
or immediately apprehensible in consciousness.”3 It’s the way
things seem to us and this seeming quality runs all the way
down to the bottom of human experience. Think about it: everything that you have ever experienced, whether it’s numbers and
duties, possibilities and finger snaps, or aesthetic experience, all
have that seeming quality.4 You are there and it is nothing other
than you that is having any particular experience. This is essentially the debate about whether or not qualia exist. There are
those who think that it can all be boiled down and reduced to
something more basic (Dennett 1993; Ryle 1949; Lewis 1995).
On this side, there are different degrees of eliminativism. Some, like Lewis (1995) say that, “Qualia is a name for the
occupants of a certain functional role that is spelled out in our
tacitly known folk psychology.” Philosophers following in the
footsteps of Ryle would might be inclined to say something like
this: “Talk of the mental can be reduced to talk of publicly observable behaviours.” Whereas, Dennett would want to shift the
burden of proof over to those who purport to have knowledge
about qualia. Dennett himself writes, “I want to make it just as
uncomfortable for anyone to talk of qualia—or “raw feels” or
“phenomenal properties” or “subjective and intrinsic properties”
or “the qualitative character” of experience-with the standard
presumption that they, and everyone else, knows what on earth
they are talking about.”5 On the other side, there are those who
think that there is a debate to be had, and that we do in fact have
epistemic access to “phenomenal properties” or “raw
feels” (Nagel 1974). David Chalmers takes it that there are three
basic types of arguments against those of the materialist or
eliminativist persuasion: (1) ‘The Explanatory Argument’, (2)
‘The Conceivability Argument’, and (3) ‘The Knowledge Argument’.6
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What the EA, CA, KA all have in common is that they
purport to undermine some materialist explanation of consciousness by pointing out the way things seem to us—that is, they all
purport to demonstrate the existence of qualia. They do this by
trying to undermine a materialist metaphysics that would have
us think that qualia can be reduced down to physical properties
of experiences, which are physical events (Lewis 1995). As
Chalmers (2002) himself puts it, “Each denies a certain sort of
close epistemic relation between the domains: a relation involving what we can know, or conceive, or explain.”
Now, there are many ways to resist these three arguments, but for the purpose of this essay I will only need one
way. As stated at the beginning of this paper I will argue that
(P1) when a proposition p, contains a word that lacks a determinate truth condition, we have no epistemic access to form a belief about p. (P2) If we cannot form a belief about p, any meaning that p has will not refer to the existence or identity of something which we cannot be mistaken about. (P3) Thus, all theories
of explaining, conceiving, or knowing qualia don’t satisfy the
conditions of P1 and P2, and thus, qualia-talk is not talk about
anything. The EA, the CA, and the KA, although intuitively appealing, are not reasonable objections to a materialistic theory of
qualia. But don’t just take my word for it, let’s now see if I can
demonstrate the truth of P1, P2 and P3.
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Let’s look at some cases where people are purportedly
talking meaningfully about qualia. Dennett’s hallmark case is
what is known as Chase and Sanborn.10 The thought experiment
goes something like this: Mr. Chase and Mr. Sanborn work for
Maxwell house and they were experts in making sure that Maxwell house coffee always tasted the same. One day, Mr. Chase
confessed to Mr. Sanborn that the coffee no longer tasted as it did
when he started working for Maxwell house; and it’s not that the
coffee has changed in taste, it’s that his taste has changed. Mr.
Chase just doesn’t like that taste anymore. Mr. Sanborn confesses that he feels the same way, with one exception; he thinks that
his tasters (that is to say, his taste- analyzing perceptual machinery) have changed. He still loves that taste. Dennett proceeds to
analyze the thought experiment put forth.
He claims that there are three possible explanations for Chase’s
change in taste:
(C1) Chase’s coffee-taste-qualia have not changed, but
his reactive attitudes have.
(C2) Chase is wrong, his qualia have shifted slowly over
the years without him noticing.
(C3) Chase is somewhere between (1) and (2)11
Dennett also claims that there are three possible explanations for
Sanborn’s change in taste:
(C1) Sanborn is right; his qualia have shifted
(C2) Sanborn’s standards have shifted and he is misrepresenting his past experiences

(C3) Sanborn is somewhere between (1) and (2)12
In what follows we will follow Chase and Sanborn on a
philosophical journey lasting three days, where Chase and
Sanborn try to give an account of their qualia experience.
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DAY 1: Chase and Sanborn explain (and hopefully rigidly
designate) their qualia
Let’s assess the case of Chase and Sanborn in light of the
EA. The EA would state that there really is something that was
there, that isn’t there anymore; i.e., there really was this way in
which either Chase or Sanborn were fully acquainted with their
old taste of coffee. The EA would say that we need to explain
how the phenomenal property of “the-taste-of-coffee” was there
at one point, but isn’t there presently if the coffee is the same.
Proponents of the EA would say that since there was a change in
the phenomenal property but no change in the physical property
there must be some way that either Chase or Sandborn have this
first- personal acquaintance about the way it feels to drink that
particular cup of Maxwell house. Therefore, the EA seems to
show us that there is this special knowledge of the phenomenal
property that either Chase or Sandborn possess.
However, the EA is mistaken because it overlooks the crucial fact that we can know what it is like to have some special epistemic access to a phenomenal property absent from the experience of the thing that has that property. In other words, Chase has
no way of knowing whether or not his coffee-taste-qualia have
changed or his reactive attitudes have changed. Remember that
the EA holds that, explaining anything, entails explaining qualia.
But in this case, there is no way to show that we are actually talking about qualia or for that matter explaining anything. Absent of
a criterion of assessing whether or not (P1) (P2) or (P3) are true
of either Chase or Sandborn we cannot reasonably hold that there
is an explanatory gap because to do so, we first need evidence
that we are talking about something that needs further explaining.
But we don’t even have the confidence that we are identifying the
qualia of our experiences because our naming of an ‘x’ as qualia
does no work in pinning down whether or not that ‘x’ is a change
in our taste, a misrepresentation of our past experience, or our reactive attitudes. If this indeterminacy holds then the EA cannot be
said to provide an explanandum; just empty attempts at an explanans. Thus, any proposition about Chase or Sanborn’s qualia
must contain a referent with an unspecified meaning. It might be
a meaningful proposition—it is metaphysically possible that it has
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a referent we don’t know about—but we can’t analyze it, and
thus, we can’t say that we are talking about something. My conclusion to the EA is that it doesn’t give us the epistemic resources
to talk meaningfully about qualia. But maybe the CA will give us
some sort of acquaintance with qualia, and thus allow us to talk
meaningfully about them?
DAY 2: Chase and Sanborn try to imagine themselves as
zombies
Let’s tackle the problem of Chase and Sanborn with a version of
the CA that zombifies Chase and Sanborn; that is, let’s treat them
as if they were philosophical zombies.
(P1) It is conceivable that Chase and Sanborn are
zombies.
(P2) If it is conceivable Chase and Sanborn are zombies,
it is metaphysically possible that Chase and Sanborn are
zombies.
(P3) If it is metaphysically possible that Chase and
Sanborn are zombies, then consciousness is non-physical.
(C1) Consciousness is non-physical.
I’m going to argue that when a proposition p, contains a
word that lacks a determinate truth condition, we have no epistemic access to form a belief about p.13 Chalmers tells us that it is
part of the zombie argument to suppose three things: (1) “It is
conceivable that there be a system that is physically identical to a
conscious being, but that lacks at least some of that being’s conscious states”, (2) These zombies will look identical from a thirdperson point of view, and finally, (3) that things will be different
from the first-person point of view.14 To sum up, zombie Chase
and zombie Sanborn will show up for work at the same time as
real Chase and Sanborn; they will even talk about coffee the same
way, and report changes in qualia, but deep- down-inside we
know that they don’t have the conscious experience that we do.
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There is a great deal at stake in saying that it is possible to
conceive of zombie Chase and zombie Sanborn. So, let’s try to
understand what it would look like for the first premise of this
argument to be meaningful. We would have to know what it
would be like to separate ourselves from supposed intrinsic, ineffable, and private experiences; to experience everything from the
third-person point of view. In other words, we would have to
know that ‘there is an ‘x’ and that ‘x’ is a property of my experience.’ But how could we know this? How could Chase and
Sanborn, sitting in the corporate lounge of Maxwell House talking about what it would be like for them to exist without their
conscious experience know this? Again, let’s return to the three
possible explanations that we have accounting for either Chase or
Sanborn’s taste in the coffee. Let’s just try to imagine what it
would be like for them to conceive what it would look like for
one to be true and the other to be false. Let’s say that Sanborn is
convinced with the truth of the first possibility.15 Does he have
any reason to suppose that this is the case over the truth of the
second possibility?16 No. He has no criterion to assess whether
the first possibility of the second possibility is correct—or even
whether some possibility in-between is correct. He can’t conceive
of what it would look like for one to be true and the other false
because he has no epistemic access whether or not his qualia have
really shifted or if he is simply misrepresenting his past experiences. To think that it is possible to conceive that Chase and
Sanborn are zombies is to say that it is possible to distinguish between the purported phenomenal qualia and what we understand
to be the experience of the qualia. For it to be possible would be
to think that we can conceive of a separate epiphenomenalistic
world, which entails that we have the capacity to refer to this
world. But, Kripke’s causal theory of reference would seem to
suggest that, if this separate world exists, we would be able to
know and refer to our qualia.17 But since zombie Chase and zombie Sanborn can’t distinguish between what it would look like to
refer to their qualia, they aren’t really referring to it at all, they
are just using folk psychological shorthand to muddily describe
some aspect of their experience.18 If both the EA and the CA
don’t give us the epistemic resources to talk meaningfully about
qualia maybe the KA does?
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DAY: 3 Chase and Sanborn give a phenomenological account
of their coffee experience
Let’s tackle the case of Chase and Sanborn with a version
of the KA that swaps out consciousness for the taste of coffee:
(P1) There are truths about the taste of coffee that are not
deducible from physical truths.
(P2) If there are truths about the taste of coffee that are not
deducible from physical truths, then materialism is false.
(C1) Therefore, materialism is false.
Again, I’m going to argue that when a proposition p, contains a word that lacks a determinate truth condition, we have no
epistemic access to form a belief about p.19 So, let’s try to understand what it would look like for the first premise to be meaningful. For Chase and Sanborn to know that P1 is true they would
have to know the following: There is a separate realm of experience that has causal effects on us but is not reducible down to
physical reality. On this view, there is a problem with how we can
be said to be acquainted with something that doesn’t have causal
powers in the physical world. Recently, Michael Tye has put forth
an argument against this position called the ‘Acquaintance Hypothesis.’20 Although he deals with Frank Jackson’s problem of
Mary and her supposed phenomenal experience of colour, I will
substitute Mary for Chase and Sanborn and colour for the taste of
coffee. The argument would look something like this:
(1) Qualia are physical properties of experiences. Let Q be
such a property.21
(2) Chase and Sanborn have been locked in a room since
birth with a big book called ‘Everything you can ever
know about the taste of coffee’. They read this big book
over and over again, and thus they know all about Q and
they can know that a given experience has Q before release, although—before release—they are not acquainted
with Q.
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(3) After release Chase and Sanborn get acquainted with
Q, but they do not acquire any new item of propositional knowledge by getting acquainted with Q (in
particular they already knew under what conditions
normal perceivers have experiences with the property
Q).
The KA hinges on the idea that there is something special
about our knowledge of the taste of coffee, but as I have shown
here, there is nothing special about that knowledge, there is only
a series of special occurrences where we have the taste of coffee
that seem special to us. In other words, knowledge about the taste
of coffee is a knowing-how and not a knowing-that. This means
that there is nothing special about it that is over and above the
physical; just ways of talking. Now, imagine Chase and Sanborn
when they are released from their room and they jump up and
down about the taste of coffee and in unison exclaim: “The taste
of coffee! Ah, it is unlike anything I have ever experienced. Indeed, somebody must have ripped a page out of our ‘Everything
you can ever know about the taste of coffee’ book.” What could
they possibly be talking about? Is it knowledge? I think, alongside Dennett, that Wittgenstein’s ‘beetle in a box’ example is a
good illustration to understand what is going on here:
“The thing in the box has no place in the language-game
at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be
empty—No, one can “divide through” by the thing in the
box; it cancels out, whatever it is.”22
What Wittgenstein is trying to get at in this example is
that certain words or phrases in our language disguise themselves
as if they functioned like definite descriptions, but they really are
in the business of naming and not describing; and these names
need not have a meaningful referent. Well, if the EA, the CA, and
the KA don’t give us the epistemic resources to talk meaningfully
about qualia then what does?
So, can we talk about Qualia?
So, is there anything that give us the epistemic resources
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to talk meaningfully about Qualia? Nothing. There are no epistemic resources that we have to talk meaningfully about qualia.
Qualia are not objects of knowledge because all sentences containing qualia terms lack determinate truth conditions, and thus
we cannot be said to have the epistemic access that we need to
form a belief about a sentence purporting the existence of qualia.
If we cannot say whether a sentence that purports knowledge of
qualia is true then even if the purported qualia sentence has meaning, it doesn’t necessarily designate the existence or identity of
something. I have shown that the three theories of explaining,
conceiving, and knowing qualia don’t satisfy the conditions of
meaningfulness that is needed. Thus qualia-talk isn’t talk about
anything. In my view, there is nothing to explain about qualia;
nothing to conceive, and nothing to know.
If you find that you still aren’t convinced let’s take another look at an argument that hinges on Chalmers conceivability
argument.23 Let Q be the be claim that ‘it is conceivable that qualia are non-reducible phenomenal properties.’ Let R be the claim
that ‘qualia cannot be wholly reduced to physical properties of
experiences. If Q then it is possible that Q. If it is possible that Q
then R. This can be illustrated as follows:
1.

2.

→◊

3.◊

→

4.

Now, let’s suppose the opposite and perform a reductio ad absurdum.
1. ~ 2. ~ → ~ ◊

3. ~ ◊

→ ~ 4. ~

This can be read as follows: Suppose that it is not the case that it
is conceivable that qualia are non-reducible phenomenal properties. If it is not the case that it is conceivable that qualia are nonreducible phenomenal properties then it is not possible that it is
conceivable that qualia are non-reducible phenomenal properties.
If it is not possible that it is conceivable that qualia are nonreducible phenomenal properties then it is not the case that qualia
cannot be wholly reduced to physical properties of experiences.
Since R has a negation in the claim itself, negating it
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creates a contradiction and proves the opposite to be the case:
~Q: It is not conceivable that qualia are non-reducible phenomenal properties. Of course, all of this hinges on accepting my claim
that it is not possible to conceive of qualia. But I think that I have
done a good job in securing that as a possible premise because in
all the cases (EA, CA, and KA) I have shown that we don’t have
the epistemic resources to talk meaningfully about qualia, and
thus all qualia-talk is contained in propositions that lack determinate truth-conditions and don’t satisfy tenable conditions of
meaningfulness. The alternative that I wish to propose is that
qualia talk is best understood as picking out—or naming—
occupants of the part of a folk-psychological role.24 This also explain why we can make sense of our qualia-talk. For it’s not that
we don’t know what we are doing when we engage in qualia-talk.
We know perfectly well what it means to say that, ‘the Maxwell
House just doesn’t taste as good as it used to.’ We are making a
repot about what we subjectively think that coffee tastes like.
Does this mean that qualia-talk isn’t useful? No. It is just as useful as talking about properties that ‘are what they are’ because we
project them onto the world. Gold has no intrinsic value, and before humans existed it didn’t have the property of being valued.
But it is a useful fiction to pretend that gold coins are a valuable
commodity. Qualia-talk is like this. It is a useful way of knowing
one’s way around in the world, but it doesn’t refer to the capital
“W” WORLD. What we do not know is what it would look like
to explain that experience as having a qualia-element absent from
the physical element (EA). What we do not know is what it would
look like to conceive of ourselves experiencing the qualia-inthemselves (CA). What we do not know is what it would look
like to be able to directly refer to qualia-phenomena (KA).
So, can we talk meaningfully about qualia; can we get our
feet off the ground and have a good solid debate about them? Yes
and no. Yes, if we relegate them to the lower case “w” world. No
if we think that they are part of the fabric of reality or a part of
the capital “W” world.25 We do need to earn the right (to borrow
a phrase from Blackburn) to talk about them in the right instances, but just because we earn the right does not mean that they really exist.26 In short, we should be fine in using and engaging in
qualia-talk in our everyday sense; we just have to know that deep
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-down-inside it’s just a way of talking and nothing more. What
follows from this is that commitments to a materialist position
must become agnostic about the existence of qualia and adopt a
form of soft-eliminativism instead of the heavy-duty eliminativism.
Notes
1. Scott Soames, Philosophy of language, (New Jersey: Prince
ton University Press, 2010), 33.
2. Let me expand on this last premise. When I say that qualia-talk is
not about anything I don’t mean that speakers who claim to be talking
about qualia aren’t talking about anything. Rather, I mean to use the
word ‘about’ in a strict sense to imply that for a thought to be about
something it must be truth-conditional and thus make an identity
claim.
3. David, Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 239.
4. Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,”
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(1956), 253-329.
5. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind, 239.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 232.
13. Ibid., 233.
14. In this case, the word is ‘conceivable’ and we can’t understand
what it would be to believe this first premise—that is, ‘conceivable’ is
a sense without a referent.
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15. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind, 233.
16. (1) Sanborn is right; his qualia have shifted.
17. (2) Sanborn’s standards have shifted and he is misrepresenting his
past experiences.

18. Saul Kripke, “Naming and Necessity,” in Semantics of Natural
Language, ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (New York:
Springer, 1972), 253-355.
19. I think that Lewis has a good explanation for what zombie Chase
and zombie Sanborn would be trying to name: “But in all probability,
there are imperfect occupants of the role, imperfect deservers of the
name.” David Lewis, “Should a materialist believe in qualia?,” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995), 142.
20. Although in this case it isn’t a word, but rather, this dubious phrase:
the taste of coffee.
21. Michael Tye, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).
22. Let this property be the taste of coffee.
23. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind, 233.
24. Ibid.
25. Lewis, “Should a materialist believe in qualia?,” 142
26. Here, I mean to make the distinction that the capital “W” WORLD
contains the things that have the properties that they have independent
of our naming them so. Things like Water being H2O and Heat having
the property of expanding metal at uniform rates. The lower case “w”
world designates those things that have their properties in virtue of our
treating them as such. They are not real strictly speaking, but it is a way
of getting around because for the bulk of our everyday lives we live in
the lower case “w” world and mostly everything we talk about exists in
the lower case “w” world. We only end up talking about the capital
“W” WORLD when we are doing things like metaphysics, mathematics, physics, or anything a priori for that matter.
27. Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 167.

42

Jordan Walters
References

Ayer, Alfred Jules, editor of Logical Positivism. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1966.
Blackburn, Simon. Essays in Quasi‐Realism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Chalmers, David. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Dennett, Daniel C., and Paul Weiner (Illustrations). Consciousness
Explained. New York: Back Bay Books, 1991.
Lewis, David. “Should a materialist believe in qualia?” Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, (1995): 140-144.
Nagel, Thomas. “What is it like to be a bat?” The Philosophical
Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435-450.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. "Qualia: The knowledge argument." 2002.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/qualiaknowledge/>.
Kripke, Saul A. "Naming and necessity." In Semantics of Natural
Language, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman,
253-355. New York: Springer, 1972.
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Routledge, 2009.
Sellars, Wilfrid. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of
Mind.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1.
No. 19 (1956): 253-329.
Soames, Scott. Philosophy of language. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2010.
Tye, Michael. Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without
Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011.

Can We Talk Meaningfully About Qualia?

43

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. New
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2009.
Quine, Willard Van Orman, Patricia S. Churchland, and Dagfinn
Føllesdal. Word and Object. Cambridge: MIT press,

